Regulatory Novelty after Financial Crises: Evidence from International Banking and Securities Standards, 1975-2016


Financial crises are often presented as triggers for important innovations in international regulation of financial markets, but existing evidence for this claim primarily derive from the analyses of individ- ual initiatives, assessed against noncomparable benchmarks. In order to provide systematic evidence of financial crises’ impact on international financial regulatory change, this paper develops a novel text- as-data approach to measure regulatory novelty. We use this approach to analyze the full population of international banking and securities standards between 1975 and 2016. Contrary to theoretical expecta- tions, our empirical findings indicate rules designed by international banking and securities regulators following financial crises are on average as likely to build on existing international regulations as those designed before a crisis. We also find that international banking rules published after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are an important exception.

forthcoming at Regulation & Governance, DOI: 10.1111/rego.12346